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Although the government has been gradually deregulating the financial
markets with moves such as the liberalization of bank entry and branching
and, more recently, the liberalization of the enlry and scope of operations of
foreign banks, it continues to directly intervene in the credit markets by
maintaining several special credit programs. In fact, the list of special credit
programs for agriculture and small and medium industries remains long
(Table 1).Interestingly, a significant number ofthem were introduced during
the last six years when the government was supposed to pursue its stated
policy of rationalizing and consolidating various government-initiated
special credit programs.
The features of the existing special programs are considerably different
from those of previous programs. For one, the Central Bank is no longer
involved in managing special credit programs. This responsibility has been
transferred to the relevant government financial institutions, i.e., agricul-
tural credit programs to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and
industrial credit programs to the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). For another, lending conduits are now more varied than before, and
they include almost all rural financial institutions and nonfinancial institu-
tions, specifically nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Lastly, the
lending rates to conduits and the relending rates charged by conduits to
end-users are now freely determined by the market.LAMBERTE:POLICY-BASEDLENDINGPROGRAMS 225
The change in credit policy over the last decade was, of course, part of
the general effort to restructure the economy. To ease the pain associated
with the restructuring, the government secured financial assistance from
multilateral institutions, specifically the World Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB). Part of the assistance are relending programs and
policy conditionalities that bind the government to pursue the programs and
projects it decides to institute. These are the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF)
and its successor, the Countryside Loan Fund (CLF), Industrial Guarantee
Loan Fund (IGLF); Industrial Investment Credit Project (IICP) and its
successor, the IndlistHal Restructuring Project (IRP), Tulong sa Tao Self-
Employment Loan Assistance (TST-SELA) and its successors, the First and
Second NGO Microcredit Projects, and the Fisheries Sector Program (FSP).
This subset of credit programs is referred to as policy-based lending
programs.
This paper reviews and examines the special features of policy-based
lending programs and policy conditionalities, aswell as their impacts on the
various players in the credit markets.
EMERGENCE OF POLICY-BASEDLENDING PROGRAMS
Special credit programs emerged from the government's concern that the
formal credit markets had let_ out certain sectors of society such as small
farmers and enterprises and even key industries that have been deemed vital
to the development of the country. The banks' aversion to lending to small
borrowers is not without a basis. First, the transaction cost of lending to
small borrowers is a disproportionately high percentage of the amount lent.
Second, in the event of loan default, foreclosure cost can easily exceed the
anlount to be retrieved from small borrowers. And lastly, small borrowers
usually have very limited tangible and marketable assets, and in the event
of external shocks that affect the viability of their projects, they are likely
to default on their loans. Therefore, given their limited supply of loanable
funds, banks prefer to lend to large, well-established borrowers.232 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
CHOICE OF IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS
Many of the special credit programs that existed in the past were imple-
mented byvarious government institutions. Many of these institutions were
not financial entities but line agencies and bureaus or subsidiaries of line
agencies takingon credit functions such as loanapproval andcollection. As
mentioned earlier, many of them are still around. But enmeshed as they are
in bureaucratic red tape and saddled by heavy administrative cost and the
lack of skills inmanaging credit programs,special credit programshave not
been upto par in performance.
Unlike other special credit programs, policy-based lending programs
are being implemented by government-owned financial institutions (GFIs),
such as LBP and DBP. One of the objectives of these lending programs is
to support the government policy of converting the GFis into wholesale
banking institutions that would later on play a big role in mobilizing
long-term funds and in giving term loans. One previously important func-
tion of the Central Bank (i.e., the management of special credit programs),
has been tran]ferred to the GFIs. The government decided in 1987 that all
externally funded credit programs should be implemented and managed by
the GFIs.
There are advantages to having GFIs implement and manage lending
programs. First, the programs can benefit from scale and scope economies
since these institutions are in the business of lending. Second, lending
programs are being managed by professional bankers who know the credit
markets better than bureaucrats. Third, the credit programs are less subject
to political interference because transactions of GFIs are more transparent
than those of regular government agencies. Moreover, GFIs are now evalu-
ated on the basis of their balance sheets and income statements.2And lastly,
2. During the dictatorial regime of Marcos, DBP gave many loans to highly favored
corporations upon the intercession of top politiea leaders. Many of these so-called "behest
loans" turned out to be nonperforming, eventually causing the collapse of DBP. The bank
has since been rehabilitated and some provisions in its charter were amended to protect it
from any political interference. The Aquino administration respected the independence of
DBP. and the oresent administration of President Ramos will likely continue this policy.LAMBERTE: POLICY-BASED LENDING PROGRAMS 243
of their risk exposure and the administrative cost in handling the loan
accounts of target beneficiaries.
There is considerable variation in the gross margin realized by lending
conduits across types ofpolicy-based lending programs. Under the IICP and
the IRP, this margin ranges between three and six percentage points; under
the ALF and the IGLF, between five and eight percentage points; and under
the NGO Microcredit Program, it stands at around 11 percentage points.
Clearly, gross margins vary inversely with the size of borrowers being
addressed by the lending programs (Figure 1). This may be due to the higher
risk and administrative cost involved in lending to small borrowers as
opposed to large borrowers. Certainly, these spreads give lending conduits
a reasonable net profit from these lending programs. 9
On End-Users
Perhaps the most important impacts of policy-based lending programs on
end-users have to do with access and the cost of credit. However, informa-
tion on this issue is quite limited because, among the policy-based lending
programs reviewed, only the ALF and the First NGO Microcredit Program
have so far oonducted end-user verification surveys. For other programs,
case studies and impressions of officers of implementing agencies are the
main sources of information.
According to DTI's report, the end-users of the NGO Microcredit
Program belong to the so-called "nonbankable" types with practically very
limited assets that could be used for collateral and very low household
income. The interest •rates they pay, though pegged_to the prevailing
commercial rate in the area, is much lower than those prevailing in the
informal credit markets.
In contrast, the end-users of the ALF, the IGLF and the IICP belong to
the "bankable" types with sufficiently mortgageable assets. In other words,
most of them already have access to bank credit. In fact, most of their loans
were used for the expansion of existing projects. One might hasten to
9. FSPistheexception tothisstatement sinceLBPonlybreakseveninitsoperations.250 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
from special credit programs substituted for the banks' own funds that
should have been used to service the credit needs of their clients. In effect,
therefore, the externally funded policy-based lending programs helped
finance the fiscal deficit. Of course, one can argue that the situation could
have been worse, i.e., a smaller amount of credit would have flowed to the
economy at higher rates of interest, were it not for the additional funds
coming from the externally funded credit programs.
Second, the funds of policy-based lending programs have been coursed
through lending conduits that have been operating in a less competitive
environment. They have therefore extracted some rents from such credit
programs. Lamberte (1992) has shown that the banks' spread, i.e., the
difference between the lending and deposit rates adjusted for intermediation
taxes such as the reserve requirement and the gross receipts tax, increased
during the period 1981-1990, and this can be largely explained by the
increasing banking concentration. The implication here isthat the passed-on
rate, i.e., the interest rate charged by GFIs to lending conduits that is keyed
to the weighted average interest rate on time deposits has been lower and
that the interest rate paid by end-users has been higher than what they should
have been under a competitive environment. The policy-based lending
programs could have also included reforms in competition policy.
Third, some Credit programs especially those that target cottage and
small enterprises and are considered "nonbarrkable," made a conscious
effort to use alternative lending conduits, specifically NGOs, that can
efficiently deliver credit to such beneficiaries. However, the spread they
realized from such programs proved to be very high, leading one to question
the alleged comparative advantage of these institutions in delivering credit
to the so-called "nonbankable" ones. Although there is a need to continu-
ously look for alternative, nonconventional mechanisms for delivering
credit to the so-called "nonbankable" ones, the promotion and nourishing
of inefficient credit delivery systems must be avoided. It may be worthwhile
for the economy to use the same resources in improving the profitability of
the projects of "nonbankable" entitiesthrough infrastructtlre development,
and trade and industrial policy that encourage competition, and throughLAMBERTE:POLICY-BASEDLENDINGPROGRAMS 255
the First NGO Microcredit Program shows rising incomes experienced by
beneficiaries.
The ilCP and IRP have provided large term loans to only a few
sectors. 14.However, their impact on the performance of these sectors cannot
be determined at this point since these programs have just started. This may
be a good subject for future research.
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The oligopolistic structure in the credit markets occurs from the presence
of only a few banks vis-/t-vis a greater number of end-users. In this situation,
the lending conduits can dictate the price. The market rate in essence is the
rate which results due to the presence of restrictions in the entry to the
market.
The high level of interest rate in the Philippines was noted as a deterrent
to the modernization of the agricultural sector. Dr. Lamberte, however, said
that the more crucial issue is the stability of rates rather than the level. Rural
borrowers are concerned also with lack of access to credit rather than the
level of interest rate. Results of various studies on the rural credit markets
have been consistent on this observation.
International agencies are putting conditionalities on credit programs,
considering that there is a free market system, because the conditionalities
support the reforms towards free market and they want to ensure that the
reforms will not be reversed. But sometimes even ifthe conditionalities have
been lifted, government still continues to use donor agencies to push for
some policies.
Regarding gender issues in the credit markets, Dr. Lamberte stated that
these are being addressed in some credit programs especially those involv-
ing the NGOs (e.g., Grameen). However, this is not a binding concern.